The knowability paradox is usually formulated as a problem about the static propositions which express the knowledge that we can achieve in principle. In this paper, I propose to put these issues in a more 'dynamic' light, by shifting the emphasis to the epistemic actions that produce knowledge, or sometimes even ignorance. The very notion of 'knowability' seems mainly an existentially quantified residue of knowledge-producing actions, just as 'provability' is the static property of propositions that remains when we suppress their live proof and its production. In particular, can every static proposition which is true trigger a dynamic action of announcing that it is true, or of learning that truth? Keeping track of what actions do over time is notoriously difficult, as the truth values of relevant propositions keep changing in processes of computation, physical movement, games, or communication. We discuss some basic issues that arise when we place 'knowability' in a setting of one or more epistemic agents performing a possible variety of epistemic actions.
or we ask some expert who knows! The latter actions involve a notion of change beyond proof steps: new information changes the current epistemic model -and in the process our knowledge changes, too. The simplest mechanism achieving this reflects the folklore sense in which 'new information shrinks the current range of possibilities':
An announcement of some proposition P changes the current range of possible worlds, leaving those where P holds, while removing all others.
More precisely, consider an epistemic model (M, s) , with designated actual world s.
What can be known in this setting seems restricted to what might be known correctly about that actual situation s. We know already that it is one of the worlds in M. What we might learn is that this model can be shrunk further, zooming in on the location of s. In this dynamic epistemic setting, we can recast the Verificationist Thesis as follows.
Saying that every true statement may be known amounts to stating that there is
What is true in the current setting may come to be known there
VT-dyn
What this means in a simplest scenario is that some authoritative true statement could be made which changes the current model (M, s) to some submodel (M| , s) where the relevant proposition is known. Indeed, announcing itself seems an obvious and infallible candidate for this purpose, but more on this in a moment.
The dynamic turn toward knowledge-producing actions involves some delicate issues.
A first thing to note is that making announcements is not just a matter of accumulating knowledge. This is true for atomic facts -but truth values of more complex epistemic assertions can change in the process. When I tell you that p, which you did not know, the statement K you p changes its truth value from false to true. But at the same time, the iterated knowledge statement K you ¬K you p goes from true to false -and so on upward, with changes in iterated statements of epistemic reflection. Thus, one single action ! of publicly announcing can have repercussions for truth values across the epistemic language. In particular, the Moore sentence shows that some propositions have the 'self-afflicting' property of changing their own truth value when they are announced:
A true public announcement !( q & ¬Kq) of q & ¬Kq makes the fact q into common knowledge, thereby invalidating the conjunct ¬Kq.
Thus, announcing a truth is not an infallible way of turning it into knowledge. We will investigate the subtleties of epistemic update in the next section. For now, we contrast our new dynamic view with the earlier consistency requirement on CK.
Here is the connection between our new proposal VT-dyn and the earlier CT: . (This would not work in weaker epistemic semantics than that for S5.)
One can read the following discussion up to Section 7 either way, as being about knowledge of a single agent, or about common knowledge in a group.
As for epistemic inference, well-known complete axiom systems exist for the valid laws in this language over standard model classes, such as multi-agent S5 (plus common knowledge) for models where the accessibilities are equivalence relations. Finally, as to computational complexity, most current versions of epistemic logic are decidable.
Dynamic epistemic logic
To deal with the dynamics of Section 4, we need to add epistemic actions to this framework. Here, the driving engine for update of agents'
information is model change. liberating to move to new problems instead of remaining stuck with old ones. In particular, one additional idealization of the dynamic setting seems worth pondering.
The central valid law of the logical calculus of public announcement reduces knowledge resulting from communication to relativized knowledge that was true before:
) .
The semantic soundness of this principle has its own further presuppositions, including perfect memory of agents (Liu 2006) . This idealization has been called into question in game theory and cognitive psychology under the heading of 'bounded rationality'.
Moving beyond single knowers, however, the most exciting applications of epistemic logics to-day emphasize the multi-agent character of speakers, hearers, and audiences.
In particular, even Hintikka's original language can iterate knowledge assertions, as in K 1 ¬K 2 P "1 knows that 2 does not know that P" Also, common knowledge was a group phenomenon par excellence. 'Social' epistemic notions are crucial to information flow and communication. Some philosophers think such issues are not profound, having to do with gossip, ICT, and other shallow necessities of living with a lot of people on one small planet. But the pursuit of knowledge and rational behaviour consists to a large extent of intelligent interaction with others -and we need to understand that success. This point will return below, as so-called paradoxes afflicting lonesome knowers may look brighter in groups.
Interaction, partial observation, and event update Public announcement is a basic mode of transmitting information. But information can flow in many more subtle ways.
E.g., we observe informative events without overt linguistic aspects. And crucially, observation can then be different for different observers. I see which card I am drawing from the current stack, you only see that I am drawing one. By now, sophisticated event update mechanisms exist for such phenomena, far beyond simple world elimination (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998 ). These can model complex multi-agent forms of communication mixing public actions and information hiding. Think of whispering to your colleagues during a seminar, or sending an email using the button bcc. In cases like these, the current epistemic model need not shrink: it may even grow in size.
Example: Reading a Letter You have taken an exam, but neither you nor your friend knows the outcome yet. Here is a simple epistemic model, where in fact (viz. the boldface actual world to the left), you passed:
Now you receive a letter in the presence of your friend, and read that you have passed.
If this were a case of public announcement, the model would just shrink to the left-hand world as before. But this time, you cannot tell whether your friend has seen the content of the letter, though she does know it is an official notification. She might, and she might not have seen what you read -and so, as far as she is concerned, you might also have been reading a letter which says that you failed. In this case, taking both your situations into account, there are 3 relevant possible pairs of simultaneous events:
(you read Pass, she reads Pass) (you read Pass, she sees nothing) (you read Fail, she sees nothing)
The first two joint events can only occur if you have passed, the third if you failed. Note also that these events themselves have epistemic relations. E.g., you cannot distinguish the first from the second, and she cannot distinguish the second from the third. In that world, by standard evaluation in terms of epistemic logic, you know that you passed, she knows it, too, but you do not know that she knows. These are typical asymmetries of information that arise between players in the course of a card game. problematic assertion that some upcoming exam in the following week will take place on a day 'when the student does not expect it'. Gerbrandy shows how the usual perplexity dissolves once we see that the teacher's assertion can be of the above true-but-self-refuting type. E.g., with a two-day time span, the formula for the teacher's statement in our dynamic-epistemic logic is this (writing Ei for 'the exam is on day i'):
This says that the exam is on Day 1, and you do not know that now, or it will be on Day 2, and even learning that it is not on Day 1, you will not know that it is on Day 2.
For details and a further defense of this analysis, we refer to the cited publication.
Simple epistemic models of the above sort then clarify various surprise exam scenarios.
From paradox to typology These observations do not suggest at all that one must
ban self-refuting assertions -as has been proposed in some remedies to the Fitch Paradox. To the contrary, they rather bring to light a rich diversity of types of behaviour which calls for a dynamic typology of epistemic assertions. E.g., we can investigate which precise forms of assertion are 'self-fulfilling', in that they do become common knowledge upon announcement. For instance, all universal modal formulas are selffulfilling in this sense. These are the ones constructed using atoms and their negations, conjunction, disjunction, K i and C G . 
K& Autodidactics
He shows that each successive type is more demanding than the preceding. Moreover, at least on epistemic S5-models, all three notions of learnability are decidable. Further notions of learning arise with iteration of true assertions, perhaps even the same one.
Baltag, van Ditmarsch, Herzig, Hoshi & de Lima 2006 present sophisticated update calculi of this sort, and they prove in particular that, when added to our basic logic of public announcement, the logic of 'truth after some announcement' stays axiomatizable.
Thus, once again, the 'paradox of knowability' turns from a nuisance into an interesting phenomenon to be studied, and a source of intriguing new logical questions. 
Digression: reachability with event updates

This says that, if
is true now, announcing it makes it common knowledge that it was true at the preceding stage. Some conversational moves work in just this way -like when people say in response to some assertion that "I knew already what you told me".
One might see this as one plausible sense in which the Verificationist thesis does hold:
Every local truth right now can come to be known as being true now at some later stage of investigation.
Indeed, analyzing the Paradox of Knowability in an explicit temporal epistemic logic has been proposed before, e.g., in Edgington 1985. In such a formalism, all the above issues still make sense. In particular, we now want to know precisely which assertions will persist over time, from Y4 to It has to be said that this greater expressive power also has its price. In particular, statements of valid 'learning principles' , and complexity of epistemic-temporal logics, depend in subtle ways on which precise strength we give to the temporal operators.
This section has presented a number of technicalities that may seem non-germane to our general discussion. But the way we see it, these demonstrate that any 'banning' response to the Fitch paradox would be a bad idea, as it would deprive us of a rich area of investigation, offering a lot of genuine insight into how we come to know things. With k muddy children, k rounds of public ignorance assertions achieve common knowledge about who is dirty, while the announcement that the muddy children know their status achieves common knowledge of the whole situation. Thus, public assertions of ignorance can drive a positive process of gathering information, and their ability to eventually invalidate themselves (the earlier-mentioned phenomenon of 'self-defeating' assertions) may even be the crowning event. The last announcement of ignorance for the muddy children led to their knowing the actual world. This puzzle high-lights the interplay of many agents, and also the passage of time. We consider both in turn.
Multi-agent learning Our scenario suggests that learning becomes more interesting, and less 'paradoxical' in a multi-agent setting. Indeed, we do not need Muddy Children to make this point. Even much simpler epistemic models can represent interesting scenarios of communication which might be hard to keep straight just in words.
Consider the following simple example involving three worlds and two agents: Thus, Verificationism becomes a more varied issue in communities of epistemic agents.
Temporal perspective once more: game theory and learning theory Dynamic epistemic logics describe single steps in larger processes where information flows.
There seems to be a growing consensus that such long-term procedures are crucial to 'coming to know'. Our concerns so far then merge into larger issues about interactive agents with goals and strategies for achieving them. Thus, dynamic-epistemic logic meets game theory (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994) and learning theory (Kelly 1996) , including strategic equilibria and convergent learning procedures in both finite and infinite settings. These links go beyond the present paper, but their import is clear. In the final analysis, what one can come to know is intimately intertwined with the how!
Conclusion
We have looked at the Paradox of the Knower in a dynamic-epistemic perspective where learning means changing the current epistemic model. The problematic Moore sentence driving the paradox turns out to be the typical 'probe' for investigating the sometimes surprising, but always useful, effects of successive assertions. Moreover, the multi-agent setting of epistemic logic places Verificationism in a richer interactive setting. This change in perspective trades the atmosphere of paradox and disaster for one of free exploration of dynamic typology of epistemic assertions, learning and reachability, and many further surprising twists in the logic of communication.
Even so, we do not claim the last word on Verificationism, the origin of the Fitch puzzle. The proof-theoretic paradigm of evidence for what we know also has a ring of truth. And indeed, the dynamic approach so far has no insightful take on the 'information' that comes to us via deduction (cf. Egré 2004 , Jago 2006 . Updating with
